The Daily Skunk

The sky is falling, right? Wrong, that is old news. This time the bottom is dropping out. Everywhere we turn someone has a new bailout request to help sustain our ailing economy. The squeakiest wheels are getting the grease. The taxpayers are getting squeaky about the greasing. We all know  we cannot borrow our way out of debt. What no mainstream media outlet is talking about here is the real problem at hand. Over the last fifty years we have went from a manufacturing and product exporting economy to a service based and product importing economy. Has anyone noticed that America does not really produce and export anything other than money, grain, and a few products here and there.

When I was growing up, there were several factories in my town. We made air conditioners, gloves, and bicycles. We even had a butcher block factory. We had three large printing companies.  Trucks pulled into town empty and left full. Trains brought in huge rolls of paper and hauled finished print products like books and magazines to distribution centers across the country. Today, we are a town full of fast food restaurants and chain stores. Trucks and trains do not load here anymore they just stop for fuel and snacks. Our large printing shops have now become warehouses. Our air conditioner factory moved to China and its building sits vacant. The bicycle factory has been converted into a storage facility. It is full of imported electronic gadgets and bottled tap water.   As a country, how can we come out ahead if we continue to let our manufacturing jobs leave? We can not really expect to lead the world economy by providing service and selling each other foreign made goods. We make money, but it is not new. It is only the same money traded back and forth among us.  A simple example of what I am talking about is found in a bottle of water at a convinience store. We bottle and sell tap water to eachother, drink the water and throw the bottle in a landfil. Money is exchanged, taxes are paid, but nothing new is brought into the country.   We have to manufacture products and sell them to the rest of the world. The only way to help our economy (for real) is to re establish our manufacturing base.

I am sure my town is not alone.  Millions of former factory and assembly workers from all across the country have had to find new ways to earn a living. 

How did this happen? Who is to blame? Some say government bureaucracy and a foolish tax code. Some will say big unions drove up labor costs, so the factories went where labor was cheaper. Still others will blame Wal Mart for driving out the mom and pop shops.  Politicians and trade agreements are easy targets for part of the blame also. If you asked many of our grandparents they would tell you that our generation is not willing to work hard as they had to.

 
The real question should not be who is to blame but how can we get it back. That is what really matters. To play on the analogy of spokes in a wheel, how many of our jobs are really producing something new for our country and how many are simply riding the wheel? I understand that every  job is a spoke that is part of  the wheel turning, but our turning wheel is growing while the axl that spins it is shrinking. All of these bailouts we keep reading about are simply grease easing tension on the squeaky axle. I am afraid that if we do not increase the strength and size of the axle very soon, it will snap.   Manufacturing has traditionally been the axle that turns America’s economic wheels. If we do not make and export more products than we import,  we will soon run out of a means to pay for it all.

I had a great idea strike me just moments ago:

Let’s give America’s big three auto makers welfare!  Damn, Pelosi beat me to it. 

Wait, I have another:  Let the auto makers bust the unions and open the positions up to ANYONE who will do it (with the caveat that anyone be LEGALLY in our country).  Now we are on to something. Especially since Ford recently admitted it can’t build small cars to compete with Japanese makers because labor costs are too high.  What a sham. 

I hereby re-nominate Pelosi for Loser of the Year.  Seconds?

Let the slinging begin!

I’ll come out and say it, “I voted for John McCain”.  I’m not afraid to say that as I am very proud of voting Republican and what that vote stands for.  I can stand for a change in government, in fact I am all for it once and a while, but this election was not the time.  This election to me was a bandwagon election.

Thinking back through the months prior to the election and talking with friends and relatives about why they are voting for Barrack Obama brought up many questions.  One question is, do you actually know what his policies are?  Think about it, if you went up to a majority of the Obama supporters out there, do you really think they understand why they are voting for him or is it just because the celebrities are doing it, he’s black or it’s against the norm.  Way to many times I would ask someone, “tell me one reason why you are voting for Barrack” and so many times I would get responses about his character or that he stands for change.  Well, anyone running for President in these times most likely stands for change, duh.  People have no idea why they voted for Obama other than to jump on the bandwagon of what some elite people think is a good idea.

Point proven right here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GqAiarOhC2U.  Listen to this clip and this will explain why I am blabbering on about why I think this election was a fraud.  Another example, being Republican, I do watch Fox News and I was watching Hannity and Colmes a couple of weeks before the election and they had on about 20 Obama supporters.  Hannity asked the whole group of people “name one specific accomplishment of Barrack”, not one person out of 20 could name something he has done.  They all named character traits about the man.  Not one person could name something he has done to further this nation other than be a good speaker and that is the man the majority of the country put their support behind.  That makes no sense.

Here are a couple of other links that are very convincing to my argument:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PGeu_4Ekx-o

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzFOOcEQtP0

Well, I guess this uneducated fool gets to voice his thoughts now.  With the addition of roughly $1,000,000,000,000 debt to our balance sheet, we may indeed bankrupt our country by trying to “save” it. 

At what point will we all realize that the government has overstepped the Constitution, or rather left it atop a huge, steaming pile of…

Does the rule of law not exist?  Has the founding document of this nation been discarded?  Exactly what rules are we playing by now?  May I have a copy of them?

The current congress is a piece of shit.  If any of my employees, or yours, behaved in such a manner to achieve a 9% approval rating, they would be out.  No severance, no retirement.  Just fired.  Not even time to clean out their desks.  Maybe even get a security escort off company grounds.  But these dupers have led us to the edge of a chasm, and are pushing ever harder to get us to step in.  Why?

All I know is this:  I can’t ever be a victim; I fight back.

Say what you want about Senator Barack Obama’s lack of experience, but remember that George Washington had literally NO experience whatsoever before he assumed the Presidency of the United States. Lincoln as well had little experience before his trip to the White House. And George Bush, sadly, had lots of experience in government and look how well that worked for us. I would rather have a literate (it would be nice to have a President who can speak a goddamn sentence without stuttering and “misspeaking” like a retarded meth-head), extremely well-educated (his tenure as the editor of the Harvard Law Review[1], an accolade shared by only those who inhabit the highest echelons of legal academia, speaks volumes of his intellectual capabilities), but inexperienced man who has new ideas that inspire hope in so many Americans who have looked at the last eight years of this abysmal failure of a Presidency with disgust. Four more years of this, please excuse my francais, ridiculous pseudo-Republican bullshit (try playing the game, “find a Republican who believes in small government” these days) will push this country off the precipice and into a very real and extremely nasty culture war. We live in a time when Conservative Republicans attempt to vilify their Democratic opponents by calling them “latte-sipping” and “arugula-eating” demonstrates the embarrassing devolution of the American political landscape.

What’s perhaps most disturbing about this election is that we are witnessing the biblical fall of John McCain – a man once known as the “Maverick” Republican now panders to the backwards, intellectually bankrupt Christian Right (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/13/AR2006051300647.html) has now run attack ads on Barack Obama that deal with none of the substance of his candidacy; instead these ads amount to nothing more than desperate feces-slinging.

Obama isn’t perfect. We need to know more about his healthcare position. We need to know about his plan to improve America’s security. We need to know the details of how he plans to extricate our armed forces from the quagmire that is Iraq. And on a personal level, I would love for Obama, and for that member, the rest of the Democrats, to change their ridiculous policy on firearms. He needs to remember that shitting on the constitution (secret prisons in Eastern Europe, thousands of detainees held without charges, having the Supreme Court determine elections, the curiously misnamed “Patriot Act,” which could hardly be less patriotic, etc.) is this current batch of Republicans’ shtick. Also, Obama has the added virtue of not having called his wife a “see you next Tuesday” in front of reporters.

Regards,

Jonathan P. Figdor

We are coming upon one of the most interesting and scary elections (based on outcome – either way) in the history of the United States, in my opinion.

I believe this is going to divide our country like few things have since the Civil War. I know this sounds extreme, and I’m not implying that any state is going to secede, but people will surely leave the country over it and I can see it is going to be trouble. The trouble is going to come primarily in the form of distention and anger from the people. There will be areas of this country where Americans will not feel welcome by fellow Americans in ways that haven’t been for decades.

At the core this election is not about a black man vs. a white man, or an old decrepit man vs. younger better educated man. It’s not about a man who will need a genie in a bottle for vice president to accomplish all that he has promised vs. a man who changes his stance on issues so often we don’t know where he stands. And for most its not about loyalty to one party who realizes little about economics (even though they claim to) in how unrealistic they are about paying for the great ideas vs. one party who realizes nothing of the environment and humanity.

So here are my thoughts. If Obama loses this election, there are going to be many groups of people (white, black, and many countries across the world) claiming that the election was fixed and that America is racist.

If Obama wins, the groups of people who will be upset about this are the wealthy, those who gross a lot and take home little (something most who have never owned a business don’t realize possible – and no I do not gross a lot and I still take home little – I just know that many small businesses who have employees fall into this category – because of taxes) and people who are truly racist.

I want to leave you with a few thoughts. When will we acknowledge that the presidency has become a self and cohort serving position that has lost most anything that ever was meant to truly represent the people. The founders of our country left nations of kings and now in an obscure way we have allowed for and created new ones.

The next election will absolutely initiate some big ideas and changes from the people. It is going to leave our country with a lot of questions about our current system of government and what we really need to run this nation.

Finally, what if we didn’t have 2 or more people running against each other, so there is no winner and no 1 group of people who are winners – wouldn’t this be a step towards unification, if we all were in it together?

And for the record, I don’t care for either candidate. I have considered not voting in the next election. I also tend to be an idealist trapped inside a realist body.

A Humanist Position on Abortion

I

Why Do We Need A Humanist Position on Abortion?

As I read theological perspectives on abortion from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim scholars, I was struck by the fact that I hadn’t encountered a Humanist position. This is particularly interesting to me in light of the fact that Humanism is now regarded as an officially recognised religion by the United States government – a fact belaboured upon by both hardline atheists such as Christopher Hitchens and religious apologists. Since Humanism is a religion, we ought to have some sort of position on abortion – one of the most morally complex and troubling issues of our time. However, we cannot have a theological perspective since we doubt (or flat-out deny) the existence of God. Hence, our theological position has to be atheological. This paper is an attempt to fill this void and develop a Humanist position on abortion. I will begin by explicating the basic beliefs and tenets of Humanism. Then I will discuss the manner in which Humanists think about morality. Finally, I will develop a Humanist position on abortion that values both the life and life choices of the mother, and is attentive to the fact that a fetus has moral worth and deserves some consideration.

II

What is Humanism?

Humanism, while a complete philosophical system with an ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, is hardly a monolithic movement. Humanism lacks any kind of centralised authority, hence, there is a great degree of diversity of viewpoints within the movement. However, there are a few general principles that most, if not all, Humanists hold.

First, Humanists highly value the principle of free inquiry. Paul Kurtz, in A Secular Humanist Declaration, writes, “The first principle of democratic Humanism is its commitment to free inquiry. We oppose any tyranny over the mind of man, any efforts by ecclesiastical, political, ideological, or social institutions to shackle free thought.”[1] Kurtz builds his account of rights and civil liberties off the groundwork of free thought. He writes, “Free inquiry entails recognition of civil liberties as integral to its pursuit, that is, a free press, freedom of communication, the right to organise opposition parties and to join voluntary associations.”[2] Further, not only does respect of the principle of free inquiry entail these rights and civil liberties, but it also “requires that we tolerate diversity of opinion and that we respect the right of individuals to express their beliefs.”[3] Finally, having laid out what is gained by adhering to this principles, Kurtz explains the reason underlying the acceptance of it. He argues that “The guiding premise of those who believe in free inquiry is that truth is more likely to be discovered if the opportunity exists for the free exchange of opposing opinions.”[4]

It is important for us to consider, at certain points in our discussion of Humanism, not just what Humanists believe, but what they do not believe. This is because there are a plethora of myths and misinformation about Humanism which are as detrimental as they are false. While we are speaking about the freedoms guaranteed by Humanism, we should discuss the myth that suggests that Humanists seek to outlaw religion. For example, Diane Dew, a conservative Christian writer and webmaster of an influential and award-winning website on Christian theology writes, “Like other religions, it also has a goal: the supplanting of all other religions with its own.”[5] Matt Cherry and Molleen Matsumura deal with some of these myths in their publication, 10 Myths About Humanism, writing “Humanists are staunch supporters of freedom of religion, belief, and conscience, [and want to] protect the freedom of religious belief equally with the freedom of nonreligious belief, the freedom of religion equally with the freedom from religion.”[6] Further, we should clarify that while Humanism strongly values tolerance, it doesn’t fall into the trap of vacuous relativism. Kurtz writes, “Though we may tolerate contrasting points of view, this does not mean that they are immune to critical scrutiny.”[7] Finally, we ought to address the accusation made that Humanism unfairly singles out religion as the target of its critiques. Humanism, and the principles it endorses apply equally to religious and secular forms of oppression. Kurtz continues, “There are many forms of totalitarianism in the modern world – secular and non-secular – all of which we [Humanists] vigorously oppose.”[8] In light of this, it is essential to bear in mind that Humanism is more than an objection to religion – it is a positivistic philosophy of life that not only criticises religious extremists, but any extremist who would limit free inquiry. The next key belief Humanists hold is both derived from, and is, the ultimate source of their belief in free inquiry.

Humanists “hold in high regard the scientific method – the constant search for information and the willingness to change opinions as warranted.”[9] They “believe the scientific method, though imperfect, is still the most reliable way of understanding the world.”[10] The scientific method and the general practice of observation, hypothesis development, rigorous testing, and finally, a tentative claim to belief forms the cornerstone of the Humanist’s epistemology. The Humanist’s reliance on the scientific method as the best means of understanding the world should not be considered to be arrogantly asserted or as an article of faith. While science (and the scientific method in particular) is held “in high regard,” Humanists willingly admit that “all human knowledge is fallible, all claims to ultimate or absolute truth [are] questionable.”[11] Kurtz elaborates that because of the intrinsic fallibility of human beings and their perceptions of the world, “we [Humanists] are open to the modification of all principles, including those governing inquiry, believing that they may be in need of constant correction.”[12] These two claims in conjunction – that only though observation and experience can we learn and/or know anything about the world and that that knowledge is inherently fallible – motivate the Humanist to reject dogmas and any beliefs asserted without justification.

In addition to these broad methodological claims about how human life ought to be lived and how we ought to make sense of our experience with the world around us, Humanists believe that “The preciousness and dignity of the individual person is a central Humanist value.”[13] This necessarily results in and motivates the Humanist belief in the fundamental equality of persons. They write, “we see no place for prejudice on the basis of race, nationality, colour, sex, sexual orientation, age, political persuasion, religion, or philosophy. And we see every basis for the promotion of equal opportunity in the economy and in universal education.”[14] Kurtz writes, “Humanistic ethics expresses a concern for equality and social justice… Each individual is to count as equal in dignity and value, an end in himself or herself, entitled to moral considerations.”[15] The American Humanist Association writes, “We base our ethical decisions and ideals upon human needs and concerns… We measure the value of a given choice by how it affects human life, and in this we include our individual selves, our families, our society, and the peoples of the earth.”[16] Kurtz writes that “For Humanists, ethical conduct is, or should be, judged by critical reason, and their goal is to develop autonomous and responsible individuals, capable of making their own choices.”[17] Humanists ground their ethical considerations on the principle of equality, the rejection of moral absolutism and divine command morality, and their emphasis on the role of reason in evaluating moral dilemmas. Along with the idea of fundamental equality is the Humanist belief in an ethics predicated on self and mutual respect. The A.H.A. is particularly clear about this, writing “Ethics in the Humanist view is largely the responsibility we have for the well-being of others.”[18] It is this last idea – that of our responsibility to care for our fellow men and women – that is most prominent in Humanism. Both Kurtz and the AHA cite numerous examples of Humanists working towards the improvement of mankind.[19] To this I can add my own anecdotal evidence. I can assure you that I have encountered Humanists operating at every level and in every capacity in soup kitchens, homeless shelter, domestic violence shelters, free medical clinics, Habitat for Humanity building sites, after-school tutoring programs, and many others. It is also important to note that in these many endeavours, they often work side-by-side with religious people.

Finally, it is important to conclude by addressing the number of myths about and misrepresentations of Humanism that circulate even in the upper echelons of academia. For example, it may surprise many who are unfamiliar with Humanism, but “Agnosticism or atheism is a relatively unimportant part of Humanist philosophy.”[20] As a corollary to this, it is important to realise that one is not a Humanist in virtue of the fact that one is an atheist or an agnostic. While it is true that Humanists disbelieve in God (the theistic version at least), it is not their defining belief. In fact, claiming that atheism lies at the centre of Humanist thought is analogous to claiming that not eating pork is the defining feature of Jewish faith. On a related point is the question, “Do Humanists go to church?” Again, it is likely to be surprising to those unfamiliar with Humanism, but some Humanists do go to church. The AHA singles out Unitarian Universalist congregations, Congregationalist congregations, the attendees of liberal Jewish and Muslim temples and mosques, and Buddhist temples as likely places to encounter Humanists. Further, Humanists do not categorically reject the sacred texts of these host religions. Instead, Humanists tend to read these texts as valuable pieces of literature (at minimum) and as good allegories and explications of moral life (in some cases). Additionally, religious figures, including Jesus, Mohammed, and the Buddha are treated with the respect they deserve as excellent moral exemplars.

Humanism, as our inquiry has revealed, is a philosophical system based on several observations. First, Humanists claim that the only way to gain knowledge about the world is through an epistemology that values observation and rational analysis of our observations. Second, because Humanists realise that our access to reality is imperfect (our perceptions and intuitions can be wrong), they resist dogmatic assertions of fact. They submit all of their beliefs, even the overarching ones on which they ground their epistemology, to rigorous scrutiny and demand justification for them. This leads them to the importance with which they regard free inquiry. Civil liberties arise out of their respect for free inquiry. Their belief in civil liberties motivates their contention that all people deserve to be treated with dignity and respect and ought to be treated as ends (and not as mere means).

III

Relevant and Irrelevant Concerns

Before I articulate my proposed Humanist position on abortion, I want to discuss the related matter of what sorts of facts and concerns we Humanists find morally relevant to the discussion. The British Humanist Association writes:

“Humanists seek to live good lives without religious or superstitious beliefs. They use reason, experience and respect for others when thinking about moral issues, not obedience to dogmatic rules. So in thinking about abortion a Humanist would consider the evidence, the probable consequences, and the rights and wishes of everyone involved, trying to find the kindest course of action or the one that would do the least harm.”[21]

They argue that rigid and dogmatic rules do more harm than good, particularly with respect to such an ethically complex issue as abortion. They continue, “Abortion is an issue that demonstrates the difficulties of rigid rules in moral decision making. Medical science has advanced to the point where we have options that were unthinkable even a few generations ago and where old rules cannot cope with new facts.”[22] With regard to abortion, Humanists think that, among others, the following issues and concerns are morally salient:

- The life of the mother

- Would carrying a fetus to term put her life in serious jeopardy?

- Would carrying a fetus to term put her health in jeopardy?

- The life of the fetus

- The life choices of the mother (and, if applicable, her partner)

- Does she want to become pregnant?

- Does having a child fit into her plans?

- Does her partner want to have children?

- Is her partner willing to support a child?

- The health of the fetus

- Does the child have a high probability of developing a serious health condition or of being born seriously deformed?

- Does the mother want to have a child with the probability of serious health concerns and/or deformities?

- The circumstances surrounding the pregnancy

- Was the mother raped?

- Did the pregnancy come about as a result of incest?

- The age of the mother

- Is the mother too young to have a child (and is she physically, mentally, and emotionally capable of having a child)?

- The age of the fetus

- Did the pregnancy occur very recently (a few days ago), somewhat recently (late first term), or not recently (late second term to third term)?

As I’m sure this list of some of the salient moral concerns relevant to determining the moral status of an abortion has illustrated, attempting to formulate some sort of rule (even a flexible one) regarding the moral status of abortion would be futile and counter-productive. This is in part due to the idea of additional issues and concerns arising due to medical innovations. Professor Laurie Zoloft concurs, writing, “…the new terrain on which we now find ourselves [with regard to the corpus of scientific knowledge concerning human reproduction] bears scant analogy to the terrain of the rabbinic world. The biology of the Talmud was still couched in terms later altered or reframes, gamete reproduction was still not fully understood, and microbiological techniques were not even imagined.”[23] If this much evolution has occurred as of this point with respect to our understanding of human reproduction, why think that future revisions to our knowledge base on the subject will not also be required? Thus, as Humanists, we believe that we have to assess abortions on a case-by-case basis in order for us to be sensitive to any sorts of ethically relevant concerns that might emerge.

In addition to these factors, we, as Humanists, find morally salient, here are some considerations we find morally irrelevant (followed by a brief commentary explaining why we think them irrelevant):

- Human life is sacred.

- We, as, Humanists, do not believe that human life is sacred because we do not believe in the notion of sacredness. Instead, we would prefer to say that “we believe that human life is valuable.”

- Human life begins at conception.

- We think that this claim is under-determined by the available evidence. While some religions think that life begins at conception (Roman-Catholicism, for instance),[24] others think that life begins at a later point (Judaism).[25] Aside from religious views on the subject, this is a point openly debated by scientists and doctors – one upon which there is no consensus at this juncture.

- Abortion is a form of “playing God.”

- To begin with, Humanists are either atheists or agnostics (with a few Deists thrown in to keep things interesting), hence, any attempt to appeal to God and his (yes, almost universally God is alleged to be masculine) will be met with deep scepticism. But more importantly, if abortion constitutes “playing God,” then must we extend this judgment to all other medical life-saving interventions? Is the use of a tourniquet to staunch the flow of blood an instance of playing God? What about an appendectomy? Additionally, what stops one from arguing that if God created us, and gave us the medical talents we have, that he wouldn’t condone our use of these talents? After all, do any of us really think we know the will of God? And if we think we do, can we prove this knowledge to those with a deal more scepticism?

Having outlined the factors and evidence that Humanists believe are morally relevant, and explained why we think these other commonly referred-to factors are not, I will now set about establishing a Humanist perspective on abortion that will be attentive (I hope) to all the aforementioned concerns.

IV

A Humanist Perspective on Abortion

What is perhaps most interesting about the Humanist position is the relative unimportance of the issue in the grand scheme of moral dilemmas that face humankind. Jim Wallis, in his book, God’s Politics, describes a debate at Notre Dame on abortion, writing:

“One young student at Notre Dame passionately reminded the group that a legal practice that kills four thousand unborn children every day[26] is an urgent moral imperative. But she was then reminded that nine thousand people each day now die of AIDS, thirty thousand children perish every day because of hunger and diseases mostly due to poverty, and as many as half a million are lost each year in international conflicts and wars.”[27]

The loss of four thousand potential human beings each year is undoubtedly a tragedy. But there are much more pressing humanitarian projects that demand our attention, for indeed, they cost more lives and are substantially less morally questionable. Wallis, in his course at Harvard Divinity School, entitled, “Faith and Politics: Should They Mix and How?,” advocated for the view that abortion should be “safe, legal, and rare.” This is a truly Humanistic position – one that wants to reduce the number of abortions being performed in the United States, while keeping those that occur safe for both the women undergoing them and the doctors performing them.

As a Humanist, I am struck by the fervour of religious individuals’ views on abortion. Judith Jarvis Thompson, in her article, “Abortion,” begins her piece by describing the scenes of violence that all too often erupt at abortion clinics. She writes:

“On December 30, 1994, an opponent of abortion opened fire at two Brookline clinics, killing two people and injuring five others. He then went south to spray twenty rounds of ammunition into a clinic in Norfolk, Virginia. That episode was only the most extreme in a series of recent attacks on abortion providers. In the two-year period ending in December 1994, five people were murdered and at least nine wounded in similar assaults.”[28]

There is a subtle and disturbing irony located in people who consistently argue that abortion is murder, and, in expression of this view, attempt and commit murder themselves. Thompson suggests that both parties return to a more civilised form of discourse about abortion, replacing drive-bys with conversations.

A Humanist position on abortion should be generally permissive in respect of the fact that abortion is, ultimately, a woman’s choice about her body. That said, there are certain circumstances in which a Humanist would argue that it would be wrong to have an abortion. Judith Jarvis Thompson, in her influential article, “A Defence of Abortion,” states a case for the general permissibility of abortion. She bases her account on a strong interpretation of issue as primarily concerning a woman’s right to control her body. Thompson argues that we should set aside the issue of whether a fetus is a person, and instead, focus on the question of how far one’s right to life extends. One obvious limitation upon the right to life is the conflict between two individuals’ rights to life. Imagine that I am on a desert island with another person. We have both been bitten by poisonous snakes. Our first aid kit contains only one vial of anti-venom serum. The fact that I have a right to life does not mean that I have the right to the anti-venom since both of us need it. Thus, a person’s right to life is limited when it conflicts with another’s right to life. With respect to the issue of abortion, the aforementioned reasoning gives us a good reason to think that abortion is morally justifiable in cases in which the fetus’s right to life comes into conflict with the mother’s own right to life. Thus, as Humanists, we argue that if a pregnancy puts the mother’s life in real danger, the mother would be morally justified in choosing to have an abortion.

But what about the other common exceptions made with respect to abortion: that abortion is also justified in the case of rape or incest? It simply is not obvious that the woman’s right to not be raped or to not be the victim of incest ought to trump a fetus’s right to life. So how does one go about justifying those cases? Thompson uses the following example to illustrate the fact that while individuals have a right to life, this right is limited by other persons’ rights. She writes:

“You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist… He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?”[29]

This argument turns on the analogy between a woman who, unintentionally and unwillingly, becomes pregnant, and the protagonist of her allegory. She argues that while no one doubts the violinist’s (analogous to the fetus) “right to life,” this in no way gives the violinist the right to use another person’s (analogous to the mother) body in exercising that right to life. I shall take it as established that the aforementioned example illustrates the Humanist reason why we believe that abortion, in the case of rape and incest, is morally justifiable (since the pregnancy was unwilled and constitutes a severe imposition upon the woman’s rights over her body). Of course, this has been the easy part of the argument to establish – after all, many opponents of abortion make these same exceptions. However, the Humanist position goes farther than these exceptions.

Consider a case wherein a couple uses protection (condoms and an alternative form of birth control) whilst engaging in sexual activity. Despite their intention to not become pregnant and the measures they took to minimise the risk of pregnancy (the use of two forms of birth control makes pregnancy a near mathematical impossibility), the woman becomes pregnant anyway. Is a woman’s choice to have an abortion in this circumstance morally justifiable? Some say no, and base their answer on the idea that she is morally responsible for the pregnancy – after all, the choice to have sexual relations does bear consequences and one must accept responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions.

Before we address the flaws in this argument, it is essential to first discuss the cases that this argument would not cover even if it held water. Because this position hinges on the fact that the mother participated in sexual activity in full awareness of the possible consequences of her actions, anyone who wants to argue against the moral acceptability of choosing to have an abortion in this circumstance must first prove that the mother to be was cognisant of the consequences of her actions. This is going to rule out very young mothers and mothers who haven’t been apprised of the risks of abortion (perhaps their families decided that they shouldn’t attend sexual education classes?). Additionally, one can make the case that mothers who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol may also be excepted since, in their intoxicated condition, they might not be aware of the consequences stemming from their actions (however, this is an extremely controversial line of reasoning with far-reaching consequences, and as such, I will not pursue it at length).

As a Humanist, however, I think that there is no need for exceptions here. Any mother who does not want to become pregnant and takes steps to avoid becoming pregnant must be allowed to have an abortion. Consider the following example (provided by Thompson):

“If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would be absurd to say, ‘Ah, now he can stay, she’s given him a right to the use of her house-for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle.’ It would be still more absurd to say this if I had had bars installed outside my windows, precisely to prevent burglars from getting in, and a burglar got in only because of a defect in the bars. It remains equally absurd if we imagine it is not a burglar who climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in.”[30]

Leaving aside the sheer absurdity of the example, Thompson has provided us with a good reason to think that as long as one takes precautions to avoid becoming pregnant, one is morally justified in having an abortion. In this scenario, the burgler is supposed to stand-in for the fetus, the homeowner is supposed to stand-in for the mother, and the window bars are supposed to stand-in for birth controls (condoms, “the pill,” etc.). It argues that the idea of responsibility is a limited notion, and that one’s responsibility can be mitigated provided one takes steps to reduce one’s responsibility. After all, there is only so careful one can be!

At this point, one might suppose that we have gone too far in our analysis. Surely, some might argue, the Humanist position is one that seems to endorse abortion in all circumstances because it endorses the individual’s rights over her body to the exclusion of all other considerations. However, this is not our position. We must now turn to Thompson’s idea of the “Minimally Decent Samaritan.” Thompson describes a Good Samaritan as someone who goes out of his or her way at some cost to help another person. A Minimally Decent Samaritan, in contrast, is an individual who acts with respect to the basic human worth and dignity inherent in all persons. The following cases will help illustrate the difference between a Minimally Decent Samaritan and a Good Samaritan. Thompson earlier suggests that we consider a case wherein she falls sick and the only thing that will cure her is the touch of Henry Fonda’s cool hand on her brow.[31] The question is whether her right to life makes it the case that Henry Fonda is morally obligated to give her the caress she so urgently needs. In my view, Henry isn’t morally obligated to fly in (at his cost) from California to Massachusetts to provide the touch she needs. It would certainly be a choice indicative of virtue (no doubt deserving of the term Good Samaritan), if he chooses to provide this touch, but it is certainly not morally required of him. However, imagine that Henry isn’t in California, but instead, is already in the hospital room with Judith. All he needs to do to save her life is to walk across the room and touch her forehead. I would argue that for him to do so is to act as a Minimally Decent Samaritan. After all, providing this touch requires so little of him and produces so much good. If he refused to provide this touch, I would argue that he has acted badly – that he doesn’t have the virtue of human kindness that I think is essential to participation in the human moral community. Humanists would like everybody to act like Good Samaritans, but we accept the fact that not everybody is capable of such self-sacrifice. Instead, we believe that people should behave like Minimally Decent Samaritans, and that to fail to do so is indicative of some serious character flaw (here I retreat to terms more commonly deployed by Aristotelian virtue ethicists than the moral language deployed by analytic philosophers of Thompson’s tradition).[32]

So now the question is: “Is carrying an unwanted child to term an action required of Minimally Decent Samaritans?” I argue that it is not. Let’s return to the violinist example and see if we can get some traction on the idea of Minimally Decent Samaritanism. Imagine that the scenario is exactly the same, but instead of having to live with the violinist attached to one’s back for nine months, the doctor tells you that he can disconnect you in an hour and the violinist will be cured. I would find it exceptionally difficult to argue that one can simply disconnect oneself from the violinist and be deserving of no moral condemnation. After all, it is plausible, if not obvious, that saving someone’s life is well-worth the cost of an hour of your time. But what has changed? The violinist has still been imposed upon us against our will. However, the sacrifice we have been asked to make has been substantially reduced. It seems to me that the change in the sacrifice required is morally salient here. I would argue that agreeing to remain plugged into the violinist for an hour, while not morally required, is the mark of a Minimally Decent Samaritan. Further, we can play with the number of hours of being plugged in and see what sort of tension this puts on the notion of Minimally Decent Samaritanism. I would argue that it should remain uncontroversial that the virtuous choice is to let the violinist you’re attached to use your kidneys for an hour, for a few hours, for a day, and perhaps even a week. But soon we begin to find the ceiling of self-sacrifice – the limit of what people think they owe other people by virtue of their shared humanity.

This is a moral grey area, no doubt. But there is no reason to be afraid of grey areas. After all, there is a grey area with respect to the notion of baldness. How many hairs must a man lose for him to be considered bald? The fact that I cannot put my finger on a specific number doesn’t mean that the concept of baldness is a fiction, but rather that the concept has some degree of vagueness – just like the concept of Minimally Decent Samaritanism. Therefore, to put the issue in the spotlight, our question is, “is carrying a fetus to term more similar to being plugged into a violinist for an hour, a few hours, a day, a week, or nine months?”

It seems obvious to me that carrying a fetus to term constitutes a major imposition on the mother much more analogous to being plugged into a violinist for nine months than any of the other alternatives I’ve offered. Further, I think that pregnancy might even be more of an imposition than being plugged into a violinist for nine months since the effects of a pregnancy continue long after she has given birth. A woman who carries a baby to term now has an additional mouth to feed and an additional responsibility which might impede her career goals. Even if we remove these cases by suggesting that she might put the baby up for adoption (interestingly enough, this is how I actually came into existence), the consequences of a pregnancy do not disappear. Imagine a young girl who wants to be a ballerina. The changes a pregnancy would cause to her body would preclude her ability to be a ballerina (or so I am told by my dancer-friends). Asking that women make sacrifices such as these is tantamount to demanding that they act as Good Samaritans, perhaps even Exceptionally Good Samaritans, and that is asking too much.[33]

Now there are a set of cases in which having an abortion strikes me as failing to live up to the minimum expectations required by Minimally Decent Samaritanism. Consider, for example, a woman who uses abortion as a form of birth control since she is too lazy or too selfish to use other forms of birth control. Or consider a woman who reaches the ninth month of her pregnancy, and decides on a whim that she no longer wants to have a child. These decisions fail to meet the minimum standard of Minimally Decent Samaritanism because they show no regard whatsoever for the fetus.[34] What Thompson has illustrated by the violinist and burglar cases is that there are cases in which the rights of the fetus might reasonably be trumped by the concerns of the mother – not that the rights of the fetus are altogether irrelevant. Thompson characterises her position (and I, as a Humanist, believe this is a position worth our endorsement) thusly:

“[My account] does not give a general yes or a general no. It allows for and supports our sense that, for example, a sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape, may of course choose abortion… And it also allows for and supports our sense that in other cases resort to abortion is even positively indecent. It would be indecent in the woman to request an abortion… if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad.”[35]

Thus, the Humanist position, as articulated by Thompson, suggests that we have to exercise our own notions of virtue, propriety, and most importantly, our concept of the absolute minimum we owe to other human beings (manifested in Minimally Decent Samaritanism). Finally, Thompson ends her article with an important caveat that we, as Humanists, find particularly important. Thompson argues that the right to procure an abortion does not constitute the right to kill the fetus, but only the right to deny access to one’s body that is needed by the fetus. In parallel, your right to disconnect yourself from the violinist does not grant you the right to “turn around and slit his throat” (Mappes and DeGrazzia 2006, p478). The suggestion being entertained here is that if we became capable of safely transplanting fetuses to potential mothers who would volunteer to carry the fetus to term or to machines capable of serving the role of the mother’s womb, that abortion should then be regarded as morally wrong (since there would be a valid alternative that would not involve ending what might be a life).

V

Concluding Remarks

This last point brings to the forefront an idea that we Humanists think is of great importance. In an ideal world, only those women who truly wanted to become pregnant (and were capable of bearing the consequences of such a choice) would actually become pregnant. But we do not live in such an ideal world. Everywhere we turn, our wills butt up against a world that is largely indifferent to our hopes, beliefs, and desires. Everywhere we turn, luck, fate, and chance wreak havoc upon our plans and constrain our choices. Thus, we are often put in the position, not of choosing between good and evil, right and wrong, but rather between the lesser of two evils.

The abortion debate seems to be a perfect illustration of this point. We can all imagine a better world – a world where abortion is simply not necessary (for no one, even abortion’s most ardent supporters, truly likes the idea of abortion). Those of us who think that abortion is morally acceptable in the aforementioned cases believe this because although we think abortion is an awful thing, we think that the alternative (denying women the basic right to be the ultimate arbiters over matters concerning their own bodies) is far worse. We earnestly hope that someday, abortions will no longer be necessary; but until then, allowing women to have abortions, in the cases herein discussed, remains the lesser of two evils.

This is an interesting opinion piece I came across in the NY Times from the past week or two.

It discusses the fact that Barack Obama has renounced Islam, embraced the Christian faith and how this will be seen through the eyes of the Muslim world if he is elected president.

President Apostate?

The Libertarian Case for “Open Borders”

Before we begin our discussion of the Libertarian case in support of “open borders,” we ought to define exactly what we mean by “open borders.” What I have in mind is the abolition of current governmental restrictions on legal immigration – in particular the abolition of immigration quotas for individuals from certain regions, of certain races, and with certain skills. I think that it is reasonable to allow the government to continue prohibiting immigration by violent criminals, especially in light of the justice claims made by other nations on those individuals. The question of whether or not the government should require individuals to acquire work visas and submit other forms of legal entry paperwork I should like to avoid altogether. For the sake of argument, let’s assume that any individual who is not a violent criminal will be allowed to enter the country, enter the labour market, and leave the country at will.

In this essay, we will begin by discussing the philosophical underpinnings of Libertarianism and establishing absolute property rights on the grounds of the self-ownership and just acquisition arguments. I will then make the libertarian case in favour of “open borders.” Finally, we will consider and refute a few key objections.

I

The Underpinnings of Libertarianism

Libertarians offer two arguments in favour of absolute property rights: the Wilt Chamberlain argument (just transfer) and the self-ownership argument (just acquisition).

Ia

Just Transfer

Nozick uses the Wilt Chamberlain argument in order to demonstrate that we have the absolute right to do what we want with our property (including physically consuming it and transferring it to others). He asks us to assume an initial distribution that is considered to be just (perhaps because it is egalitarian). He then proposes that Wilt Chamberlain signs the following contract: “In each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him” (Nozick 161). After a year of play, a million spectators have watched him play, which means that Wilt Chamberlain “winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has” (Nozick 161). Nozick’s contention is that while these fans had many different ways to spend their money, they chose to give a small part of it to Wilt Chamberlain. In Nozick’s own words, “If D1 [our initial egalitarian distribution] was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D2, transferring parts of their shares they were given under D1 (what was it [their money] for if not to do something with?), isn’t D2 also just?” (Nozick 161). It is imperative that we recognise that inherent to Nozick’s contention are two principles: the principle of just holdings and the principle of just transfer of holdings (Nozick 150). He elaborates:

1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.

2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.

3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2 (Nozick 151).

The essential argument here is that if we own something under just circumstances (we will return to this concept later in our discussion of Nozick’s theory of acquisition) we are free to use that thing in whatever manner we wish including using it to make something else, giving it away as a gift, or trading it for goods or services. The Wilt Chamberlain argument establishes the principle of just transfer, one of the two necessary components of Nozick’s libertarian theory of justice (the other being just acquisition).

Ib

Self-Ownership and Property Ownership

The Self-Ownership argument is designed to address the matter of why we think that individuals have absolute rights over their holdings. For Nozick, the idea of self-ownership comes from the Kantian notion of treating people as “ends in themselves” and not by not using them as “resources for others” (Nozick 33). Indeed, he begins his book by stating: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)” (Nozick ix). Letting others trespass on one’s property rights (either by seizing property or by physically trespassing on her justly acquired property) is immoral since it fails to respect her “separate existence” from other individuals.

Self-ownership is total on Nozick’s view. In the same way that we own our bodies, we own our talents. Kymlicka summarises Nozick particularly well: “If I own my self, then I own my talents. And if I own my talents, then I own whatever I produce with my self-owned talents” (Kymlicka 109). Kymlicka makes clear the parallel that Nozick sees between the ownership of the self and one’s ownership of property when he writes, “Just as owning a piece of land means that I own what is produced by the land, so owning my talents means that I own what is produced by my talents” (Kymlicka 109). The self-ownership argument is not merely important for establishing that we own ourselves, but also because it informs Nozick’s view of property ownership (Nozick’s theory of just acquisition).

Having established the right to self-ownership, we must address the matter of property rights, particularly his account of just acquisition. To begin with, it is important that Nozick doesn’t merely assert that property ownership is a logical offshoot of self-ownership. Kymlicka comments, “If I own some land, I may have improved the land, though the use of my self-owned powers. But I did not create the land, and so my title to the land… cannot be grounded solely in the exercise of my self-owned powers” (Kymlicka 110). Instead, Nozick turns to the Lockean idea of leaving ‘“enough and as good left in common for others”’ (Nozick 175). Nozick writes, “The crucial point is whether appropriation of unowned land (or other resources) worsens the situation of others” (Nozick 175). Kymlicka’s summary is particularly clear. Kymlicka writes:

“For example, consider Amy and Ben, who both live off the land which is initially under general use. Amy now appropriates so much of the land that Ben cannot live off the remaining land. That might seem to make Ben worse off, but Amy offers Ben a wage to work on her land which exceeds what he was originally producing on his own. Amy also gets more resources than she initially produced, due to the increased productivity arising from a division of labour, and the increase in her share is larger than the increase in his share… Amy’s act of appropriation satisfies Nozick’s proviso, since the situation after her appropriation is better than general use in terms of material resources, for both Amy and Ben” (Kymlicka 115).

As long as Ben (or anyone else who benefits less than the metaphorical Amy) isn’t harmed by an acquirer, the acquisition is justified. As a consequence of the low standard established by the Lockean proviso, it seems rather clear that land will be acquired at an alarming rate until all available land is owned by individuals. Kymlicka nicely sums up this eventual state of affairs in his summary of the overall trajectory of Nozick’s argument:

1. People own themselves.

2. The world is initially unowned.

3. You can acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world as long as you do not worsen the conditions of others.

4. It is relatively easy to acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world.

5. Once private property has been appropriated, a free market in capital and labour is morally required (Kymlicka 120).

Before we move on, I want to draw our attention to the fact that Kymlicka describes property rights as “absolute.” This is essential to the Libertarian view of private property and will be the focus of our debate on “open borders.”

Ic

The Objections We Won’t Discuss

Unlike my previous paper, I will not critique Libertarianism from outside the Libertarian framework. I have strong reservations about Nozick’s accounts of self-ownership and just acquisition. For example, I’m disinclined to accept proposition (2) from above (that the world is initially unowned) since Kymlicka offers an equally compelling vision in which the world is jointly owned. Furthermore, as I argued in my first paper, Nozick’s theory of just acquisition is undermined due to his reliance on Lockean Proviso and its impoverished view of just acquisition as, “not worsening the condition of others.” However, valid as these concerns are, they will not be the focus of this essay. Instead, having set out the philosophical framework upon which Libertarianism in one of its more influential forms is erected, I will proceed to argue from within this framework that, given their philosophical commitment to absolute property rights, Libertarians are logically obligated to embrace “open borders.”

II

The Libertarian Case for “Open Borders”

Given the philosophical underpinnings of Libertarianism, it is simple to anticipate the arguments used in establishing the case in favour of “open borders.” The Libertarian case in favour of “open borders” is based on the idea of property rights, and argues that governmental restrictions on immigration undermine them. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, in an influential article entitled, “Natural Order, the State, and the Immigration Problem,” lays out the argument[1] thusly: “…private ownership implies the owner’s right to include and exclude others from his property” (Hoppe 78). However, since labour is a means of generating value, individuals are inclined to invite people onto their property either to work (as labourers), to consume (customers in bars and restaurants), or to travel (on roads, on airplanes, etc.). This explains why, despite our absolute ownership rights, we are still inclined to invite people onto our property. However, when the government takes the role of determining who is and who isn’t allowed to immigrate to a nation, the government acquires a role that ought to be reserved to the private citizen. Hoppe writes:

“the decision whom to exclude or include, and under what conditions, rests not with a multitude of independent private property owners… but with a single central (and centralizing) state-government as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and their properties (macro-migration). If a domestic resident-owner invites a person and arranges for his access onto the resident-owner’s property but the government excludes this person from the state territory, it is a case of forced exclusion… On the other hand, if the government admits a person while there is no domestic resident-owner who has invited this person onto his property, it is a case of forced integration” (Hoppe 81-82).

The argument here is that by allowing governments to regulate immigration, governments acquire the right both to prohibit private property owners from inviting certain individuals to enter their property and to force private property owners to allow immigrants onto their property against the property owners’ will. We Libertarians argue that this is a clear violation of the private property owner’s right to control access to his property. Now it is important to recognise that Hoppe, in developing this argument, assumes that all land that is not owned by private individuals is “owned” by the government (this includes ‘“public’ roads, places, parks and lands…” and that “everyone’s private property borders onto or is encircled by public lands and roads”) (Hoppe 82). There is something appealing (from a libertarian perspective) about the case as stated by Hoppe; by placing all power concerning immigration in the hands of property holders, we respect the property holder’s absolute right to control her property. After all, this is what we imagine that the government is doing – acting on our behalf stopping those individuals we do not want trespassing on our property. We realise that the government will ultimately fail in this endeavour since they cannot possibly hope to please every individual property holder. Necessarily, the government will have to please some to the detriment of others, as choosing to allow all immigrants hurts some private citizens who would prefer not to receive immigrants on their property, whilst banning it altogether harms those citizens who would invite immigrants onto their property.

Further, as a corollary to this argument, we must consider what happens when governments are allowed to own all the property that is not privately owned. Anthony Gregory and Walter Block argue “if the government nationalized all of the land except for private residences, it would further invade liberty to prevent people from entering this socialized land, thus keeping them locked in their own private property and precluded from entering that of other consenting, inviting owners” (Gregory 35). If the government is allowed to determine who can and cannot use public land, the government undermines the property rights of those individuals whose property is abutted by government-owned property (all citizens!). Instead of treating this land as if it were owned by the government and allowing it restrict access to this property as it sees fit, we think that this land should be viewed as an unowned resource. If we do not, we run the risk of a person acquiring it and imposing her own rules and values on this territory. Imagine if a Muslim or Jewish citizen were to appropriate the road ways in a city. They might decide that the transportation of alcohol or pork on their roads constitutes a violation of their property rights, and consequently, might bar access. We have already seen this come to pass with regard to certain state governments making it illegal for private firearm owners to transport their firearms into their states.[2] Ergo, we must treat this public space as an altogether different sort of animal.

Secondly, as Libertarians, we think that “closed borders” are incompatible with free markets and free trade. Adam Chacksfield, from the Libertarian Alliance, argues that by restricting immigration, we are tacitly regulating the market. He reasons that many people fear allowing immigrants into certain nations (Britain, for example) because this will drive up housing prices. This is a particularly acute concern in the U.K. where there is a very limited amount of property available, making fluctuations in supply and demand particularly influential on prices. However, he argues that by denying immigrants the right to come into the U.K. to buy property, we are implicitly depressing the housing market by forcing property owners to sell their property below the market value (if immigrants were allowed to purchase property, the price of the property might be higher). By restricting a private property owner’s right to sell her property to any individual she chooses, we severely undermine her property rights (the right to just transfer). This is because restricting immigration inevitably causes what Chacksfield refers to as, the “misallocation of resources” (Chacksfield 1). He elaborates, “the ‘misallocation of resources’ may sound a tame phrase, but remember that this means the employment of resources in less productive ways than would be the case in a free market” (Chacksfield 1). Bear in mind that Chacksfield isn’t using utilitarian reasoning to argue that free markets employ resources most efficiently (though I suspect he might think this too), but rather that when the government restricts the deployment of resources in certain ways, it necessarily undermines the absolute property rights of its citizens to sell their property at the best price they can negotiate.

III

Objections Considered

Having laid out the case for the Libertarian endorsement of “open borders,” we must discuss a major objection to the case. Hoppe is concerned with the problem of forced integration – cases wherein, “[the] government admits a person while there is no domestic resident-owner who has invited this person onto his property” (Hoppe 82). This is problematic since it seems to constitute a breech of property rights. Hoppe argues against the view that by extending employment offers to immigrants, employers are inviting immigrants onto their property. Hoppe argues that even if such an invitation is offered, this doesn’t constitute an invitation:

“the immigrant employer must pay only a small fraction of the full costs associated with the immigrant’s presence. He is permitted to socialize (externalize) a substantial part of such costs onto other property owners. Equipped with a work permit, the immigrant is allowed to make free use of every public facility… That is, the immigrant comes invited with a substantial fringe benefits package paid for not (or only partially) by the immigrant employer (who allegedly has extended the invitation), but by other domestic proprietors as taxpayers who had no say in the invitation whatsoever… This is not an ‘invitation,’ as commonly understood. This is an imposition. It is like inviting immigrant workers to renovate one’s own house while feeding them from other people’s refrigerators.” (Hoppe 92).

In addition to this objection, Hoppe argues that we misunderstand the public sphere and underestimate the government’s right to control land. He argues that there is no such thing as the “right to immigration.” We have argued thus far that a property holder’s right is absolute with respect to private property, but that the public sphere of governmentally-owned land isn’t subject to our individual control (this is to avoid the problem of a Muslim or Jewish citizen restricting the free movement of citizens, goods, and services). Hoppe characterises our argument as follows: “In [our] eyes, public property is

akin to unowned property and thus “open” to everyone, domestic citizen and foreigners alike” (Hoppe 90). However, he argues that, “there is a categorical difference between unowned resources (open frontier) and public property. Public property is the result of State government confiscations… of originally privately owned property. While the State does not recognize anyone as its private owner, all of government controlled public property has in fact been brought about by the tax-paying members of the domestic public” (Hoppe 90). Hoppe wants us to conclude that since this land is essentially collectively owned by the taxpayers, the taxpayers retain their absolute right to control their property, and hence, have the right to restrict access to it, thereby justifying immigration restrictions.

However, we Libertarians have a response. First, we need to realise that there are really two arguments here. First, Hoppe argues against the idea of a “right to immigrate” by claiming that since foreigners have not paid taxes to the government of the nation they wish to immigrate to, they cannot claim a right to access public property. Second, Hoppe means to argue that in addition to this, the fact that taxpayers own the land collectively gives them the right to allow or deny immigration into it at their discretion. We are willing to entirely concede the first argument since it is utterly inconsequential. I doubt very much that any Libertarian would argue that foreigners have the “right to immigrate.” They have the right to move to places into which they are invited, but obviously not to trespass on private land. The second aspect of this objection is more interesting, however. Gregory and Block entertain Hoppe’s objection and argue that Hoppe cannot maintain his position without being inconsistent. They write:

“But what if we applied such a standard (that the citizens of a nation have a right to restrict access to public property) to free trade? Goods that are imported into America under provisions of free trade are also driven around on roads, and otherwise move through socialized sectors of the economy. Many of the same folks who are forced to fund roads and consider their now-stolen private property to be “invaded” by immigrants, would also consider free-flowing goods from China and Mexico, trucked around on public roads, to be ‘invasive’” (Gregory 29).

This leaves us with a question: do individuals who find the free-flow of goods from Mexico and China to be “invasive” have the right to deny these goods access to roadways? Does this constitute an infringement on their property rights (after all, these public roads do abut their property)? By illustrating the linkage between immigration and free trade, Gregory and Block undermine Hoppe’s argument. If Hoppe wants to protect the right of a citizen to object to immigration, he must also establish the right of the citizen to oppose the free flow of trade.

Additionally, we can undermine Hoppe’s argument by use of the argument by reductio ad absurdum. Hoppe is right to attend to the problem posed by the relative freedom of public property. The problem that activities that occur on public property will have ramifications for private property owners is unavoidable. After all, even the most stringent defender of property rights agrees that while her neighbour’s actions might affect her property, she must respect those actions. This is part of the challenge of living in an open and free society. Consider the logical extension of Hoppe’s views: if we can restrict immigration on the grounds that taxpayers can restrict access to public property, we can also restrict the ownership of firearms, drugs, and even behaviours that some might find objectionable. The fact that I do not want to consume cocaine isn’t a reason for me to think that no one should have access to it. And while I can demand that no one who enters my property do things I disapprove of (snort cocaine or possess firearms), I cannot reasonable expect to extend my preferences onto the public sphere. What Hoppe has run into is the question of the limited usefulness of property rights – after all, this debate essentially concerns the conflicting exercise of property rights exercised by equally legitimate property holders with different interests.

Finally, the very concept of “closed borders,” is essentially self-refuting. Consider the following: if the US has the right to restrict immigration from other nations, then why don’t states have the same right to restrict immigration? Does the State of New York have the right to restrict immigration from Montana? It is true that New Yorkers and Montanans both pay taxes to the federal government, but New York State has higher state taxes since it must pay for mass transit and other amenities that Montana does not. Does this mean that New York can restrict immigration from Montana to prevent freeloading? What about New York City then? Does NYC have the right to restrict immigration from the surrounding suburbs? After all, NYC’s residents pay additional taxes to pay for even more public services. Should Westchester residents be allowed to freeload?

IV

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, while we certainly understand the concerns of our Libertarian brethren (that “open borders” undermine some property holders’ rights to control access to their property), we firmly believe that “closed borders” present an even more grave threat to private property rights. We are all-too-wary that once the right to restrict access to public property to immigrants is established, this right sets a precedence of restricting free trade and even further undermining the morally required free markets for goods, services, and labour. Ergo, we strenuously object to the current state of affairs and must insist that the United States adopt an “open borders” policy.

Works Cited

Chacksfield, Adam. “Open The Door.” Open The Door. 13 May 2008 <www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/polin/polin061.pdf>.

Gregory, Anthony, and Walter Block. “ON IMMIGRATION: REPLY TO HOPPE.” Journal of Libertarian Studies 21.3 (2007): 25-42.

Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. “Natural Order, the State, and the Immigration Problem.” Journal of Libertarian Studies 16.1 (2002): 75-97.

Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2001.

Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974.

Works Consulted

Dykes, Nicholas. “Robert James Bidinotto and The Contradiction in “Anarchism”.” Robert James Bidinotto and The Contradiction in “Anarchism”. 13 May 2008 <http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn077.pdf>.

Kane, Brad. “Open Borders are Utopianism?.” Stanford University. 14 May 2008 <http://www.stanford.edu/group/Thinker/v4/n5/kane.html>.

Rawls, Alex. “Responsible Immigration Policy is a Key to Liberty.” Stanford University. 14 May 2008 <http://www.stanford.edu/group/Thinker/v4/n5/rawls.html>.

Zwolinksy, Matt. “Free Markets and Open Borders.” Stanford University. 14 May 2008 <http://www.stanford.edu/group/Thinker/v4/n5/zwolinski.html>.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3QmJNZMBeg

This is billed as the most important video on the net.  See for yourself.  The text follows:

This is the most important video on the internet 

…but only… 

… if you choose to participate and if you forward this video and create your own. 

“Two thousand years ago, a Roman Senator suggested that all slaves wear white armbands to better identify them.” 

“No,” said a wiser Senator.  “If they see how many of them there are, they may revolt.” 

Today, you and I and all Americans are the slaves. 

Let us see how many are ready to revolt. 

Now, let us hear from those who support our cause. 

Exodus 20:15  Thou shalt not steal.  

      …Yahweh (the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.) 

“Steal” to take the property of another wrongfully and especially as a habitual or regular practice. 

  - Webster’s Dictionary 

The IRS steals from Americans to profit private bankers… 

100% of the money collected by the IRS goes to pay interest to banks. 

For money that they never loaned, a non-existent debt. 

“It is well that the people of the nation do not understand our banking and monetary system, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning.” 

- Henry Ford 

“We have in this country, one of the most corrupt institutions the world has ever known.  I refer to the Federal Reserve Board.  This evil institution has impoverished the people of the United States… and has practically bankrupted our government.  It has done this through the corrupt practices of the moneyed vultures who control it.” 

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  • Congressman Louis T. McFadden

“I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies.  Already they have raised up a moneyed aristocracy that has set the government at defiance.  The issuing power (of money) should be taken away from the banks and restored to the people to whom it properly belongs.” 

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  • Thomas Jefferson, U.S. President

“History records that the money changers have used every form of abuse, intrigue, deceit, and violent means possible to maintain their control over governments by controlling money and its issuance.” 

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  • James Madison

“Most Americans have no real understanding of the operation of the international money lenders.  The accounts of the Federal Reserve System have never been audited.  It operates outside the control of Congress and manipulates the credit of the United States.” 

      - Sen. Barry Goldwater (Rep. AR) 

If, as it appears, the experiment that was called “America” is at an end…then perhaps a fitting epitaph would be… 

“here lies America, the greatest nation that might have been had it not been for the Edomite bankers who first stole their money, used their stolen money to buy their politicians and press and lastly deprived them of their constitutional freedom by the most evil device yet created – The Federal Reserve Banking System” 

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  • G.D. McDaniel

What we propose is… 

A one day, national (international) strike, to make everyone aware of the numbers of people who are aware of this deceit. 

The Strike to Abolish The Federal Reserve. 

To be held on Tax Day (theft day USA) April, 15, 2008 

WHEREAS:  The Federal Reserve is an illegal corporation that operates for profit and is NOT part of the federal government of the United States of America. 

WHEREAS:  The Federal Reserve has stolen Trillions of Dollars from the citizens of the United States, without even having the Constitutional authority to exist. 

WHEREAS:  The New World Order could not continue its march to destroy America and its freedoms without the help of the Federal Reserve stockholders. 

WHEREAS:  We can never have honest politicians as long as corrupt money from this corrupt organization keeps dishonest politicians in power. 

…We the People, that favor abolishing the Federal Reserve and the income tax will be on strike or calling in sick in protest on April 15, 2008. 

Let’s end the income tax and Federal Reserve forever.  Let’s demand that the stockolders of the Federal Reserve return all that they have stolen by deceit.  They are common thieves and all that they own is owed to Americans as restitution. 

April 15^th, 2008       …the beginning of the end… 

… of the enslavement of 300 million Americans 

…and the enslavement of the world. 

The Canadians, English, Germans and French are all planning to join this strike. 

People need to create different versions of this video so that it can’t be stopped. 

Other suggestions have been made also… 

Don’t buy anything on the day of protest… 

Wear white wristbands or armbands to show your support… 

Remove most or all of your money from the bank for a couple of days around the strike… 

Save, Re-create, Re-post this video 

The 10 Primary Stockholders in the Federal Reserve System are:

1. The Rothschilds – London
2. The Rothschilds – Berlin
3. The Lazard Brothers – Paris
4. Israel Seiff – Italy
5. Kuhn-Loeb Company – Germany
6. The Warburgs – Amsterdam
7. The Warburgs – Hamburg
8. Lehman Brothers – NY
9. Goldman & Sachs – NY
10. The Rockefellers – NY

send this video to your family and friends… 

it will take millions of educated participants to create change…but change is coming