The Daily Skunk

Here is something that most of us readers probably haven’t given much thought to… writing out our will.

Yes, a will. The document that assigns all your worldly possessions to others who may or may not want them.

You know like $ to significant others, guns to father, child (yes, a responsible child that wouldn’t have access to it until they were old enough) and friends, soul to the state and IRS - wait they take that whether you give it or not…

Anyway, trust me this is something that you should do even if you don’t feel you have a lot that needs to be assigned. I have seen the problems that come from not having a will. If its not in writing other people don’t really care what was given by word. Also, if you are like me you would hate to see the state or fed. gov. get anything that you have or haven’t worked hard to aquire in your living years.

So, if you are interested - here is a free site that I found for making a will and a making a living will.

 

 

A Humanist Position on Abortion

I

Why Do We Need A Humanist Position on Abortion?

As I read theological perspectives on abortion from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim scholars, I was struck by the fact that I hadn’t encountered a Humanist position. This is particularly interesting to me in light of the fact that Humanism is now regarded as an officially recognised religion by the United States government – a fact belaboured upon by both hardline atheists such as Christopher Hitchens and religious apologists. Since Humanism is a religion, we ought to have some sort of position on abortion – one of the most morally complex and troubling issues of our time. However, we cannot have a theological perspective since we doubt (or flat-out deny) the existence of God. Hence, our theological position has to be atheological. This paper is an attempt to fill this void and develop a Humanist position on abortion. I will begin by explicating the basic beliefs and tenets of Humanism. Then I will discuss the manner in which Humanists think about morality. Finally, I will develop a Humanist position on abortion that values both the life and life choices of the mother, and is attentive to the fact that a fetus has moral worth and deserves some consideration.

II

What is Humanism?

Humanism, while a complete philosophical system with an ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, is hardly a monolithic movement. Humanism lacks any kind of centralised authority, hence, there is a great degree of diversity of viewpoints within the movement. However, there are a few general principles that most, if not all, Humanists hold.

First, Humanists highly value the principle of free inquiry. Paul Kurtz, in A Secular Humanist Declaration, writes, “The first principle of democratic Humanism is its commitment to free inquiry. We oppose any tyranny over the mind of man, any efforts by ecclesiastical, political, ideological, or social institutions to shackle free thought.”[1] Kurtz builds his account of rights and civil liberties off the groundwork of free thought. He writes, “Free inquiry entails recognition of civil liberties as integral to its pursuit, that is, a free press, freedom of communication, the right to organise opposition parties and to join voluntary associations.”[2] Further, not only does respect of the principle of free inquiry entail these rights and civil liberties, but it also “requires that we tolerate diversity of opinion and that we respect the right of individuals to express their beliefs.”[3] Finally, having laid out what is gained by adhering to this principles, Kurtz explains the reason underlying the acceptance of it. He argues that “The guiding premise of those who believe in free inquiry is that truth is more likely to be discovered if the opportunity exists for the free exchange of opposing opinions.”[4]

It is important for us to consider, at certain points in our discussion of Humanism, not just what Humanists believe, but what they do not believe. This is because there are a plethora of myths and misinformation about Humanism which are as detrimental as they are false. While we are speaking about the freedoms guaranteed by Humanism, we should discuss the myth that suggests that Humanists seek to outlaw religion. For example, Diane Dew, a conservative Christian writer and webmaster of an influential and award-winning website on Christian theology writes, “Like other religions, it also has a goal: the supplanting of all other religions with its own.”[5] Matt Cherry and Molleen Matsumura deal with some of these myths in their publication, 10 Myths About Humanism, writing “Humanists are staunch supporters of freedom of religion, belief, and conscience, [and want to] protect the freedom of religious belief equally with the freedom of nonreligious belief, the freedom of religion equally with the freedom from religion.”[6] Further, we should clarify that while Humanism strongly values tolerance, it doesn’t fall into the trap of vacuous relativism. Kurtz writes, “Though we may tolerate contrasting points of view, this does not mean that they are immune to critical scrutiny.”[7] Finally, we ought to address the accusation made that Humanism unfairly singles out religion as the target of its critiques. Humanism, and the principles it endorses apply equally to religious and secular forms of oppression. Kurtz continues, “There are many forms of totalitarianism in the modern world – secular and non-secular – all of which we [Humanists] vigorously oppose.”[8] In light of this, it is essential to bear in mind that Humanism is more than an objection to religion – it is a positivistic philosophy of life that not only criticises religious extremists, but any extremist who would limit free inquiry. The next key belief Humanists hold is both derived from, and is, the ultimate source of their belief in free inquiry.

Humanists “hold in high regard the scientific method – the constant search for information and the willingness to change opinions as warranted.”[9] They “believe the scientific method, though imperfect, is still the most reliable way of understanding the world.”[10] The scientific method and the general practice of observation, hypothesis development, rigorous testing, and finally, a tentative claim to belief forms the cornerstone of the Humanist’s epistemology. The Humanist’s reliance on the scientific method as the best means of understanding the world should not be considered to be arrogantly asserted or as an article of faith. While science (and the scientific method in particular) is held “in high regard,” Humanists willingly admit that “all human knowledge is fallible, all claims to ultimate or absolute truth [are] questionable.”[11] Kurtz elaborates that because of the intrinsic fallibility of human beings and their perceptions of the world, “we [Humanists] are open to the modification of all principles, including those governing inquiry, believing that they may be in need of constant correction.”[12] These two claims in conjunction – that only though observation and experience can we learn and/or know anything about the world and that that knowledge is inherently fallible – motivate the Humanist to reject dogmas and any beliefs asserted without justification.

In addition to these broad methodological claims about how human life ought to be lived and how we ought to make sense of our experience with the world around us, Humanists believe that “The preciousness and dignity of the individual person is a central Humanist value.”[13] This necessarily results in and motivates the Humanist belief in the fundamental equality of persons. They write, “we see no place for prejudice on the basis of race, nationality, colour, sex, sexual orientation, age, political persuasion, religion, or philosophy. And we see every basis for the promotion of equal opportunity in the economy and in universal education.”[14] Kurtz writes, “Humanistic ethics expresses a concern for equality and social justice… Each individual is to count as equal in dignity and value, an end in himself or herself, entitled to moral considerations.”[15] The American Humanist Association writes, “We base our ethical decisions and ideals upon human needs and concerns… We measure the value of a given choice by how it affects human life, and in this we include our individual selves, our families, our society, and the peoples of the earth.”[16] Kurtz writes that “For Humanists, ethical conduct is, or should be, judged by critical reason, and their goal is to develop autonomous and responsible individuals, capable of making their own choices.”[17] Humanists ground their ethical considerations on the principle of equality, the rejection of moral absolutism and divine command morality, and their emphasis on the role of reason in evaluating moral dilemmas. Along with the idea of fundamental equality is the Humanist belief in an ethics predicated on self and mutual respect. The A.H.A. is particularly clear about this, writing “Ethics in the Humanist view is largely the responsibility we have for the well-being of others.”[18] It is this last idea – that of our responsibility to care for our fellow men and women – that is most prominent in Humanism. Both Kurtz and the AHA cite numerous examples of Humanists working towards the improvement of mankind.[19] To this I can add my own anecdotal evidence. I can assure you that I have encountered Humanists operating at every level and in every capacity in soup kitchens, homeless shelter, domestic violence shelters, free medical clinics, Habitat for Humanity building sites, after-school tutoring programs, and many others. It is also important to note that in these many endeavours, they often work side-by-side with religious people.

Finally, it is important to conclude by addressing the number of myths about and misrepresentations of Humanism that circulate even in the upper echelons of academia. For example, it may surprise many who are unfamiliar with Humanism, but “Agnosticism or atheism is a relatively unimportant part of Humanist philosophy.”[20] As a corollary to this, it is important to realise that one is not a Humanist in virtue of the fact that one is an atheist or an agnostic. While it is true that Humanists disbelieve in God (the theistic version at least), it is not their defining belief. In fact, claiming that atheism lies at the centre of Humanist thought is analogous to claiming that not eating pork is the defining feature of Jewish faith. On a related point is the question, “Do Humanists go to church?” Again, it is likely to be surprising to those unfamiliar with Humanism, but some Humanists do go to church. The AHA singles out Unitarian Universalist congregations, Congregationalist congregations, the attendees of liberal Jewish and Muslim temples and mosques, and Buddhist temples as likely places to encounter Humanists. Further, Humanists do not categorically reject the sacred texts of these host religions. Instead, Humanists tend to read these texts as valuable pieces of literature (at minimum) and as good allegories and explications of moral life (in some cases). Additionally, religious figures, including Jesus, Mohammed, and the Buddha are treated with the respect they deserve as excellent moral exemplars.

Humanism, as our inquiry has revealed, is a philosophical system based on several observations. First, Humanists claim that the only way to gain knowledge about the world is through an epistemology that values observation and rational analysis of our observations. Second, because Humanists realise that our access to reality is imperfect (our perceptions and intuitions can be wrong), they resist dogmatic assertions of fact. They submit all of their beliefs, even the overarching ones on which they ground their epistemology, to rigorous scrutiny and demand justification for them. This leads them to the importance with which they regard free inquiry. Civil liberties arise out of their respect for free inquiry. Their belief in civil liberties motivates their contention that all people deserve to be treated with dignity and respect and ought to be treated as ends (and not as mere means).

III

Relevant and Irrelevant Concerns

Before I articulate my proposed Humanist position on abortion, I want to discuss the related matter of what sorts of facts and concerns we Humanists find morally relevant to the discussion. The British Humanist Association writes:

“Humanists seek to live good lives without religious or superstitious beliefs. They use reason, experience and respect for others when thinking about moral issues, not obedience to dogmatic rules. So in thinking about abortion a Humanist would consider the evidence, the probable consequences, and the rights and wishes of everyone involved, trying to find the kindest course of action or the one that would do the least harm.”[21]

They argue that rigid and dogmatic rules do more harm than good, particularly with respect to such an ethically complex issue as abortion. They continue, “Abortion is an issue that demonstrates the difficulties of rigid rules in moral decision making. Medical science has advanced to the point where we have options that were unthinkable even a few generations ago and where old rules cannot cope with new facts.”[22] With regard to abortion, Humanists think that, among others, the following issues and concerns are morally salient:

- The life of the mother

- Would carrying a fetus to term put her life in serious jeopardy?

- Would carrying a fetus to term put her health in jeopardy?

- The life of the fetus

- The life choices of the mother (and, if applicable, her partner)

- Does she want to become pregnant?

- Does having a child fit into her plans?

- Does her partner want to have children?

- Is her partner willing to support a child?

- The health of the fetus

- Does the child have a high probability of developing a serious health condition or of being born seriously deformed?

- Does the mother want to have a child with the probability of serious health concerns and/or deformities?

- The circumstances surrounding the pregnancy

- Was the mother raped?

- Did the pregnancy come about as a result of incest?

- The age of the mother

- Is the mother too young to have a child (and is she physically, mentally, and emotionally capable of having a child)?

- The age of the fetus

- Did the pregnancy occur very recently (a few days ago), somewhat recently (late first term), or not recently (late second term to third term)?

As I’m sure this list of some of the salient moral concerns relevant to determining the moral status of an abortion has illustrated, attempting to formulate some sort of rule (even a flexible one) regarding the moral status of abortion would be futile and counter-productive. This is in part due to the idea of additional issues and concerns arising due to medical innovations. Professor Laurie Zoloft concurs, writing, “…the new terrain on which we now find ourselves [with regard to the corpus of scientific knowledge concerning human reproduction] bears scant analogy to the terrain of the rabbinic world. The biology of the Talmud was still couched in terms later altered or reframes, gamete reproduction was still not fully understood, and microbiological techniques were not even imagined.”[23] If this much evolution has occurred as of this point with respect to our understanding of human reproduction, why think that future revisions to our knowledge base on the subject will not also be required? Thus, as Humanists, we believe that we have to assess abortions on a case-by-case basis in order for us to be sensitive to any sorts of ethically relevant concerns that might emerge.

In addition to these factors, we, as Humanists, find morally salient, here are some considerations we find morally irrelevant (followed by a brief commentary explaining why we think them irrelevant):

- Human life is sacred.

- We, as, Humanists, do not believe that human life is sacred because we do not believe in the notion of sacredness. Instead, we would prefer to say that “we believe that human life is valuable.”

- Human life begins at conception.

- We think that this claim is under-determined by the available evidence. While some religions think that life begins at conception (Roman-Catholicism, for instance),[24] others think that life begins at a later point (Judaism).[25] Aside from religious views on the subject, this is a point openly debated by scientists and doctors – one upon which there is no consensus at this juncture.

- Abortion is a form of “playing God.”

- To begin with, Humanists are either atheists or agnostics (with a few Deists thrown in to keep things interesting), hence, any attempt to appeal to God and his (yes, almost universally God is alleged to be masculine) will be met with deep scepticism. But more importantly, if abortion constitutes “playing God,” then must we extend this judgment to all other medical life-saving interventions? Is the use of a tourniquet to staunch the flow of blood an instance of playing God? What about an appendectomy? Additionally, what stops one from arguing that if God created us, and gave us the medical talents we have, that he wouldn’t condone our use of these talents? After all, do any of us really think we know the will of God? And if we think we do, can we prove this knowledge to those with a deal more scepticism?

Having outlined the factors and evidence that Humanists believe are morally relevant, and explained why we think these other commonly referred-to factors are not, I will now set about establishing a Humanist perspective on abortion that will be attentive (I hope) to all the aforementioned concerns.

IV

A Humanist Perspective on Abortion

What is perhaps most interesting about the Humanist position is the relative unimportance of the issue in the grand scheme of moral dilemmas that face humankind. Jim Wallis, in his book, God’s Politics, describes a debate at Notre Dame on abortion, writing:

“One young student at Notre Dame passionately reminded the group that a legal practice that kills four thousand unborn children every day[26] is an urgent moral imperative. But she was then reminded that nine thousand people each day now die of AIDS, thirty thousand children perish every day because of hunger and diseases mostly due to poverty, and as many as half a million are lost each year in international conflicts and wars.”[27]

The loss of four thousand potential human beings each year is undoubtedly a tragedy. But there are much more pressing humanitarian projects that demand our attention, for indeed, they cost more lives and are substantially less morally questionable. Wallis, in his course at Harvard Divinity School, entitled, “Faith and Politics: Should They Mix and How?,” advocated for the view that abortion should be “safe, legal, and rare.” This is a truly Humanistic position – one that wants to reduce the number of abortions being performed in the United States, while keeping those that occur safe for both the women undergoing them and the doctors performing them.

As a Humanist, I am struck by the fervour of religious individuals’ views on abortion. Judith Jarvis Thompson, in her article, “Abortion,” begins her piece by describing the scenes of violence that all too often erupt at abortion clinics. She writes:

“On December 30, 1994, an opponent of abortion opened fire at two Brookline clinics, killing two people and injuring five others. He then went south to spray twenty rounds of ammunition into a clinic in Norfolk, Virginia. That episode was only the most extreme in a series of recent attacks on abortion providers. In the two-year period ending in December 1994, five people were murdered and at least nine wounded in similar assaults.”[28]

There is a subtle and disturbing irony located in people who consistently argue that abortion is murder, and, in expression of this view, attempt and commit murder themselves. Thompson suggests that both parties return to a more civilised form of discourse about abortion, replacing drive-bys with conversations.

A Humanist position on abortion should be generally permissive in respect of the fact that abortion is, ultimately, a woman’s choice about her body. That said, there are certain circumstances in which a Humanist would argue that it would be wrong to have an abortion. Judith Jarvis Thompson, in her influential article, “A Defence of Abortion,” states a case for the general permissibility of abortion. She bases her account on a strong interpretation of issue as primarily concerning a woman’s right to control her body. Thompson argues that we should set aside the issue of whether a fetus is a person, and instead, focus on the question of how far one’s right to life extends. One obvious limitation upon the right to life is the conflict between two individuals’ rights to life. Imagine that I am on a desert island with another person. We have both been bitten by poisonous snakes. Our first aid kit contains only one vial of anti-venom serum. The fact that I have a right to life does not mean that I have the right to the anti-venom since both of us need it. Thus, a person’s right to life is limited when it conflicts with another’s right to life. With respect to the issue of abortion, the aforementioned reasoning gives us a good reason to think that abortion is morally justifiable in cases in which the fetus’s right to life comes into conflict with the mother’s own right to life. Thus, as Humanists, we argue that if a pregnancy puts the mother’s life in real danger, the mother would be morally justified in choosing to have an abortion.

But what about the other common exceptions made with respect to abortion: that abortion is also justified in the case of rape or incest? It simply is not obvious that the woman’s right to not be raped or to not be the victim of incest ought to trump a fetus’s right to life. So how does one go about justifying those cases? Thompson uses the following example to illustrate the fact that while individuals have a right to life, this right is limited by other persons’ rights. She writes:

“You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist… He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?”[29]

This argument turns on the analogy between a woman who, unintentionally and unwillingly, becomes pregnant, and the protagonist of her allegory. She argues that while no one doubts the violinist’s (analogous to the fetus) “right to life,” this in no way gives the violinist the right to use another person’s (analogous to the mother) body in exercising that right to life. I shall take it as established that the aforementioned example illustrates the Humanist reason why we believe that abortion, in the case of rape and incest, is morally justifiable (since the pregnancy was unwilled and constitutes a severe imposition upon the woman’s rights over her body). Of course, this has been the easy part of the argument to establish – after all, many opponents of abortion make these same exceptions. However, the Humanist position goes farther than these exceptions.

Consider a case wherein a couple uses protection (condoms and an alternative form of birth control) whilst engaging in sexual activity. Despite their intention to not become pregnant and the measures they took to minimise the risk of pregnancy (the use of two forms of birth control makes pregnancy a near mathematical impossibility), the woman becomes pregnant anyway. Is a woman’s choice to have an abortion in this circumstance morally justifiable? Some say no, and base their answer on the idea that she is morally responsible for the pregnancy – after all, the choice to have sexual relations does bear consequences and one must accept responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions.

Before we address the flaws in this argument, it is essential to first discuss the cases that this argument would not cover even if it held water. Because this position hinges on the fact that the mother participated in sexual activity in full awareness of the possible consequences of her actions, anyone who wants to argue against the moral acceptability of choosing to have an abortion in this circumstance must first prove that the mother to be was cognisant of the consequences of her actions. This is going to rule out very young mothers and mothers who haven’t been apprised of the risks of abortion (perhaps their families decided that they shouldn’t attend sexual education classes?). Additionally, one can make the case that mothers who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol may also be excepted since, in their intoxicated condition, they might not be aware of the consequences stemming from their actions (however, this is an extremely controversial line of reasoning with far-reaching consequences, and as such, I will not pursue it at length).

As a Humanist, however, I think that there is no need for exceptions here. Any mother who does not want to become pregnant and takes steps to avoid becoming pregnant must be allowed to have an abortion. Consider the following example (provided by Thompson):

“If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar climbs in, it would be absurd to say, ‘Ah, now he can stay, she’s given him a right to the use of her house-for she is partially responsible for his presence there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle.’ It would be still more absurd to say this if I had had bars installed outside my windows, precisely to prevent burglars from getting in, and a burglar got in only because of a defect in the bars. It remains equally absurd if we imagine it is not a burglar who climbs in, but an innocent person who blunders or falls in.”[30]

Leaving aside the sheer absurdity of the example, Thompson has provided us with a good reason to think that as long as one takes precautions to avoid becoming pregnant, one is morally justified in having an abortion. In this scenario, the burgler is supposed to stand-in for the fetus, the homeowner is supposed to stand-in for the mother, and the window bars are supposed to stand-in for birth controls (condoms, “the pill,” etc.). It argues that the idea of responsibility is a limited notion, and that one’s responsibility can be mitigated provided one takes steps to reduce one’s responsibility. After all, there is only so careful one can be!

At this point, one might suppose that we have gone too far in our analysis. Surely, some might argue, the Humanist position is one that seems to endorse abortion in all circumstances because it endorses the individual’s rights over her body to the exclusion of all other considerations. However, this is not our position. We must now turn to Thompson’s idea of the “Minimally Decent Samaritan.” Thompson describes a Good Samaritan as someone who goes out of his or her way at some cost to help another person. A Minimally Decent Samaritan, in contrast, is an individual who acts with respect to the basic human worth and dignity inherent in all persons. The following cases will help illustrate the difference between a Minimally Decent Samaritan and a Good Samaritan. Thompson earlier suggests that we consider a case wherein she falls sick and the only thing that will cure her is the touch of Henry Fonda’s cool hand on her brow.[31] The question is whether her right to life makes it the case that Henry Fonda is morally obligated to give her the caress she so urgently needs. In my view, Henry isn’t morally obligated to fly in (at his cost) from California to Massachusetts to provide the touch she needs. It would certainly be a choice indicative of virtue (no doubt deserving of the term Good Samaritan), if he chooses to provide this touch, but it is certainly not morally required of him. However, imagine that Henry isn’t in California, but instead, is already in the hospital room with Judith. All he needs to do to save her life is to walk across the room and touch her forehead. I would argue that for him to do so is to act as a Minimally Decent Samaritan. After all, providing this touch requires so little of him and produces so much good. If he refused to provide this touch, I would argue that he has acted badly – that he doesn’t have the virtue of human kindness that I think is essential to participation in the human moral community. Humanists would like everybody to act like Good Samaritans, but we accept the fact that not everybody is capable of such self-sacrifice. Instead, we believe that people should behave like Minimally Decent Samaritans, and that to fail to do so is indicative of some serious character flaw (here I retreat to terms more commonly deployed by Aristotelian virtue ethicists than the moral language deployed by analytic philosophers of Thompson’s tradition).[32]

So now the question is: “Is carrying an unwanted child to term an action required of Minimally Decent Samaritans?” I argue that it is not. Let’s return to the violinist example and see if we can get some traction on the idea of Minimally Decent Samaritanism. Imagine that the scenario is exactly the same, but instead of having to live with the violinist attached to one’s back for nine months, the doctor tells you that he can disconnect you in an hour and the violinist will be cured. I would find it exceptionally difficult to argue that one can simply disconnect oneself from the violinist and be deserving of no moral condemnation. After all, it is plausible, if not obvious, that saving someone’s life is well-worth the cost of an hour of your time. But what has changed? The violinist has still been imposed upon us against our will. However, the sacrifice we have been asked to make has been substantially reduced. It seems to me that the change in the sacrifice required is morally salient here. I would argue that agreeing to remain plugged into the violinist for an hour, while not morally required, is the mark of a Minimally Decent Samaritan. Further, we can play with the number of hours of being plugged in and see what sort of tension this puts on the notion of Minimally Decent Samaritanism. I would argue that it should remain uncontroversial that the virtuous choice is to let the violinist you’re attached to use your kidneys for an hour, for a few hours, for a day, and perhaps even a week. But soon we begin to find the ceiling of self-sacrifice – the limit of what people think they owe other people by virtue of their shared humanity.

This is a moral grey area, no doubt. But there is no reason to be afraid of grey areas. After all, there is a grey area with respect to the notion of baldness. How many hairs must a man lose for him to be considered bald? The fact that I cannot put my finger on a specific number doesn’t mean that the concept of baldness is a fiction, but rather that the concept has some degree of vagueness – just like the concept of Minimally Decent Samaritanism. Therefore, to put the issue in the spotlight, our question is, “is carrying a fetus to term more similar to being plugged into a violinist for an hour, a few hours, a day, a week, or nine months?”

It seems obvious to me that carrying a fetus to term constitutes a major imposition on the mother much more analogous to being plugged into a violinist for nine months than any of the other alternatives I’ve offered. Further, I think that pregnancy might even be more of an imposition than being plugged into a violinist for nine months since the effects of a pregnancy continue long after she has given birth. A woman who carries a baby to term now has an additional mouth to feed and an additional responsibility which might impede her career goals. Even if we remove these cases by suggesting that she might put the baby up for adoption (interestingly enough, this is how I actually came into existence), the consequences of a pregnancy do not disappear. Imagine a young girl who wants to be a ballerina. The changes a pregnancy would cause to her body would preclude her ability to be a ballerina (or so I am told by my dancer-friends). Asking that women make sacrifices such as these is tantamount to demanding that they act as Good Samaritans, perhaps even Exceptionally Good Samaritans, and that is asking too much.[33]

Now there are a set of cases in which having an abortion strikes me as failing to live up to the minimum expectations required by Minimally Decent Samaritanism. Consider, for example, a woman who uses abortion as a form of birth control since she is too lazy or too selfish to use other forms of birth control. Or consider a woman who reaches the ninth month of her pregnancy, and decides on a whim that she no longer wants to have a child. These decisions fail to meet the minimum standard of Minimally Decent Samaritanism because they show no regard whatsoever for the fetus.[34] What Thompson has illustrated by the violinist and burglar cases is that there are cases in which the rights of the fetus might reasonably be trumped by the concerns of the mother – not that the rights of the fetus are altogether irrelevant. Thompson characterises her position (and I, as a Humanist, believe this is a position worth our endorsement) thusly:

“[My account] does not give a general yes or a general no. It allows for and supports our sense that, for example, a sick and desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to rape, may of course choose abortion… And it also allows for and supports our sense that in other cases resort to abortion is even positively indecent. It would be indecent in the woman to request an abortion… if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad.”[35]

Thus, the Humanist position, as articulated by Thompson, suggests that we have to exercise our own notions of virtue, propriety, and most importantly, our concept of the absolute minimum we owe to other human beings (manifested in Minimally Decent Samaritanism). Finally, Thompson ends her article with an important caveat that we, as Humanists, find particularly important. Thompson argues that the right to procure an abortion does not constitute the right to kill the fetus, but only the right to deny access to one’s body that is needed by the fetus. In parallel, your right to disconnect yourself from the violinist does not grant you the right to “turn around and slit his throat” (Mappes and DeGrazzia 2006, p478). The suggestion being entertained here is that if we became capable of safely transplanting fetuses to potential mothers who would volunteer to carry the fetus to term or to machines capable of serving the role of the mother’s womb, that abortion should then be regarded as morally wrong (since there would be a valid alternative that would not involve ending what might be a life).

V

Concluding Remarks

This last point brings to the forefront an idea that we Humanists think is of great importance. In an ideal world, only those women who truly wanted to become pregnant (and were capable of bearing the consequences of such a choice) would actually become pregnant. But we do not live in such an ideal world. Everywhere we turn, our wills butt up against a world that is largely indifferent to our hopes, beliefs, and desires. Everywhere we turn, luck, fate, and chance wreak havoc upon our plans and constrain our choices. Thus, we are often put in the position, not of choosing between good and evil, right and wrong, but rather between the lesser of two evils.

The abortion debate seems to be a perfect illustration of this point. We can all imagine a better world – a world where abortion is simply not necessary (for no one, even abortion’s most ardent supporters, truly likes the idea of abortion). Those of us who think that abortion is morally acceptable in the aforementioned cases believe this because although we think abortion is an awful thing, we think that the alternative (denying women the basic right to be the ultimate arbiters over matters concerning their own bodies) is far worse. We earnestly hope that someday, abortions will no longer be necessary; but until then, allowing women to have abortions, in the cases herein discussed, remains the lesser of two evils.